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11.1  Introduction 
1 I.  1.1 
The United  States is  in the middle of  a trade  war-or at  least a 
skirmish-with  its largest trading partner and one of its closest allies. 
The most important battle of this conflict is being fought over lumber. 
The first confrontation came in June 1986 when President Reagan im- 
posed ad valorem duties of up to 35 percent on imports of wooden 
shakes and shingles, which are primarily supplied by Canada.' The 
Canadians retaliated almost immediately with duties on a hodgepodge 
of  imports from the United  States, including Christmas trees, com- 
puters, semiconductors, and books. 
The shakes and  shingles industry is  relatively  small, with annual 
U.S. sales of only $80 million and Canadian imports of $50 million per 
year. On  October  16, 1986, however, the  U.S. Department of  Com- 
merce  issued  a preliminary finding that Canada was  subsidizing its 
softwood (construction) lumber imports at the rate of  15 percent of 
their value. This finding followed an initial determination by  the In- 
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) that U.S. lumber producers were 
being materially harmed by Canadian imports. This set the stage for 
the  United States to impose a  15 percent countervailing duty on is- 
suance of  a final Commerce Department finding of subsidy (due De- 
cember 30) and a final ITC determination of material injury (due by 
February 1987). Pending these expected final determinations, importers 
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of Canadian lumber were required to post bonds equivalent to 15 per- 
cent of the value of their shipments  (subject to refund should the United 
States eventually drop its countervailing duty action). 
The softwood lumber industry is important to both countries. Sales 
in the United States total approximately $10 billion per year, and Ca- 
nadian  imports amount to $3 billion  per year.  In Canada, softwood 
lumber is  a  $5  billion  per year industry  and  is  larger  than metals, 
agriculture,  fisheries, and autos combined. Lumber accounts for ap- 
proximately 4 percent of both Canadian GNP and Canadian exports 
to the United States. Canadian imports hold roughly 30 percent of the 
U.S. market and provide over 99 percent of the foreign lumber supplied 
to the United States. 
A week prior to the October 16 announcement of the U.S.  softwood 
lumber decision, Canada’s minister for international trade had called 
U.S.  producers’ lobbying for tariff protection “total harassment” and 
explicitly  warned of retaliation.2 On November 7, with  support from 
liberals and conservatives in Parliament, the Canadian government im- 
posed a 67 percent countervailing duty on U.S.  corn exports to Canada. 
Within two weeks, as tensions over the U.S. lumber duty mounted, 
the U.S. secretary of  state (then embroiled in the Iran-Contra scandal) 
was in Ottawa attempting to find grounds for U.S. backtracking on the 
lumber duty. With the 15 percent U.S. duty scheduled to become per- 
manent on December 30, Canadian and U.S. negotiators reached an 
agreement on December 31  that implemented a  15 percent Canadian 
export duty in exchange for the U.S.  lumber industry dropping its duty 
action. As of 1987, the corn retaliation remained in place. 
In terms of the size of the import sector and the anticipated domestic 
price  effects,  the  U.S. lumber  duty was the largest  countervailing/ 
antidumping action that the country has ever taken against a specific 
trading partner under the terms of GATT. The Canadian corn retaliation 
represented the first countervailing duty ever imposed on the United 
States and one of the few times Canada has imposed such a duty on 
any nation. Within Canada, the eventual lumber export tax has been 
assailed  by  the timber  industry  as “bizarre”  and ‘‘sickening,”3 and 
opposition parties had urged the Mulroney government to reject any 
negotiated settlement and to mount its opposition to U.S. protectionist 
measures through U.S. and international judicial proceedings. The ne- 
gotiated  settlement, they argue, puts Canada in  a defensive posture 
and establishes precedents that leave “any major Canadian export . . . 
subject to this kind of action by the United  state^."^ The Mulroney 
government, meanwhile, defends itself on the grounds that U.S. do- 
mestic political  pressures could not possibly  have been deflected by 
Canada, and that it is better that Canada collect the revenues from a 
lumber duty than have  the revenues flow to the United  States. But 341  Political Economy of Protectionism 
even Canada’s trade minister  laments  that  “today  it’s  lumber-to- 
morrow it could be any number of issues. This is not the way to conduct 
business between the world’s largest trading partners. There must be 
a better way.”5 
Interestingly, the timber trade war is taking place in the middle of 
high-level negotiations aimed at reaching a general free trade arrange- 
ment between the United States and Canada. The future and direction 
of the free trade negotiations, however, have been threatened by the 
lumber controversies. Public support in Canada for an agreement has 
declined  markedly  over the last  year,  as opinion  polls  show rising 
distrust of U.S. motives and promises, declining faith in the abilities 
of Canadian negotiators,  and a general waning of the faith that free 
trade will improve the Canadian economy. In the face of these senti- 
ments, even Prime Minister Mulroney has noted (specifically within 
the context of the lumber affair) that it is “extremely difficult for any- 
one, including Canadians, to be friends with the Americans.”6 
11.1.2  Can the United States Win a Trade War? 
It goes without saying that there is much concern or hope, depending 
on one’s viewpoint, that protectionist  “sentiments”  are on the rise in 
the United States and that a major change in the direction of U.S.  trade 
policy may be in the offing. I suspect that among economists the pro- 
tectionist trends afoot are viewed with apprehension. New theoretical 
developments and a certain amount of playing to the public’s height- 
ened nationalistic  predilections  may  have  softened  the profession’s 
traditional,  if  not downright doctrinaire, preaching of free trade, but 
most economists appear to continue to worry that protection that leads 
to cycles of  confrontation  and retaliation  is  nationally  and globally 
harmful. 
The U.S.-Canadian rift over lumber trade provides a potentially re- 
vealing example of  one of the paths that the nascent changes in trade 
policy can take. On the face of it, the circumstances of the timber trade 
war do not appear extraordinary.  The U.S. industry  has been in the 
employment and output doldrums for a number of years; prospects for 
sharp improvement are not particularly encouraging; and import mar- 
ket shares have been on the rise. On the Canadian side, the lumber 
industry is an important industry in the economy-overwhelming,  in 
fact, to certain regions  of the country.  It is unrealistic to think that 
Canada would not respond in some substantive way to attempts to limit 
its access to export markets. 
The political origins and economic consequences of the timber trade 
war are the focus of this study. The former appear to lie in a combination 
of a well-organized and forceful group of beneficiaries (that is, U.S.  lum- 
ber producers) and a serendipitous  timing of congressional pressures on 342  Joseph P.  Kalt 
the White House. The outcome, to date, of the timber trade war has, 
indeed, been an improvement in the lot of domestic producers, as they 
have realized a rise in the price of lumber. From the broader perspective 
of nationalistic aggregate welfare, the United States appears to have 
started, but ultimately  lost, the war.  What began as a large-country, 
monopsony tariff directed against Canada has become a large-country, 
monopoly tariff directed against the United States. 
11.2  The U.S. Countervailing Duty Decision 
U.S. restrictive action against the importation of softwood lumber 
from Canada originated  with  a  1982 petition  to the  Department of 
Commerce and the International Trade Commission. This petition was 
filed by  the Coalition for Fair  Lumber Imports (CFLI), a  lobbying 
association of 350 U.S. forest products companies and each of the eight 
major lumber and timber trade associations.  The Coalition requested 
that the United States impose countervailing duties against Canadian 
softwood imports under the terms of the (amended) Tariff Act of 1930. 
The Coalition argued  that countervailing duties were warranted be- 
cause Canadian federal and provincial governments were subsidizing 
the production  of  softwood  lumber, and  subsidized  production  was 
materially injuring U .S. lumber producers. 
The 1982 case ended in May 1983 when the Department of Commerce 
failed  to rule  in favor of the U.S. lumber industry.  In  essence, the 
Commerce Department found that there was ample evidence that Ca- 
nadian governmental policy was subsidizing lumber production through 
below-market pricing of trees sold by public forest authorities, but that 
these subsidies were “generally available” and not specifically targeted 
at lumber producers. In the view of the Department of Commerce, this 
lack of  specificity  disqualified  the Canadian  subsidies  as actionable 
under the countervailing duties provisions of the 1930 Tariff Act. 
A  reading of  the record of  the  1982 case leaves the very  strong 
impression that the Commerce Department (or, more realistically, the 
White House) was squirming to find a technicality under which it could 
reject the Coalition’s petition. Under the “general  availability” crite- 
rion, the Commerce Department found that below-market-price trees 
were available  to a number of  parties beyond  construction lumber 
producers, including manufacturers of pulp and paper,  plywood and 
veneer, furniture, turpentine, and food additives. Within months of the 
lumber decision, however, the Commerce Department was enunciating 
a “dominant use”  standard in order to provide protection  to the do- 
mestic steel industry, which was requesting countervailing duties against 
imports of  Brazilian  steel made with  subsidized iron ore (which has 
uses, albeit minor, beyond  steel production). Under this standard, a 343  Political  Economy of  Protectionism 
subsidy could be generally available (in other words, to sectors other 
than the export industry of concern), but still qualify for countervailing 
duties, if  the dominant user of  the subsidized inputs if  found to ma- 
terially injure U.S.  competitors. In the case of Canadian softwood  trees, 
the lumber industry is by far the dominant user. 
The broadening of the qualifications for countervailing duties prompted 
the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, with  strong support from a 
number of  members of the House and Senate, to again  petition for 
protection. The resulting  1986 petition found the Commerce Depart- 
ment boxed in by the new precedent of its “dominant use” standard 
and the strong possibility that a negative decision would be overridden 
by federal legislation. The White House, in deciding whether to back 
the adoption of a countervailing duty, faced this second constraint as 
well  as the fact that five  Republican  senators from major  lumber- 
producing states (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Georgia, and Alabama) 
were facing reelection challenges. Thus, with virtually the same sub- 
stantive record before it (and, if anything, a slightly improved domestic 
industry), the Commerce Department reversed its  1983 decision and 
determined that purported Canadian  lumber subsidies  did  meet the 
requirements of the Tariff Act. 
11.2.1 
The basic substantive argument of the U.S.  lumber industry before 
the Department of Commerce is succinctly summarized in table 11.1. 
Over 95 percent of Canadian softwood timber lands are publicly owned, 
compared to  only 28 percent in the United States. The various Canadian 
governmental authorities  sell the rights to remove trees from public 
forests to private logging companies (including lumber producers). The 
price  at which  the right  to remove a  tree is  sold  is  known  as the 
The Case before the ITC and the Commerce Department 
Table 11.1  U.S.  and Canadian Stumpage Prices 
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“stumpage  price.”  In  most  Canadian provinces,  stumpage fees  are 
based on mechanistic (if not totally arbitrary) formulas that work back 
from a selected end-market value, subtracting administratively deter- 
mined forest-to-market costs to arrive at a value of trees on the stump. 
By  contrast, rights to harvest timber  on U.S.  public lands are sold 
through a bidding process (with problems of its own) that is designed 
to recover full market value. 
As indicated in table  11.1, the Canadian and U.S.  systems for de- 
termining stumpage prices produce dramatically different results. U.S. 
prices are commonly many times higher than Canadian prices, and this 
holds even after adjustments for quality, transportation  differentials, 
and production costs. This evidence that Canadian stumpage policy 
results in much lower Canadian stumpage prices has formed the central 
argument for protection before the ITC, the Commerce Department, 
Congress and, most recently, US.-Canadian negotiators.’ 
Evidence of the type presented in table 11.1 has been employed by 
interested parties to establish the existence of a Canadian lumber sub- 
sidy. ITC standards, however, require that any purported subsidy must 
be shown to cause material injury to domestic producers before coun- 
tervailing duties may be imposed. The standards of  “material injury” 
are problematic for the ITC. Economic criteria might be quick to equate 
“injury”  with reduced profitability. Virtually any industry facing im- 
port competition will satisfy this criterion. The patterns of ITC cases, 
however,  suggest that  “material injury”  commonly is interpreted as 
giving protection a bailout role. The criteria for determining the extent 
to which an industry is in  need of protection under this definition of 
material injury, as revealed by ITC practice, include the existence of 
negative profits, declining employment, plant closings, and declining 
prices. 
It is not sufficient (at least  not  according to the ITC’s legislative 
mandate) that an industry seeking countervailing protection be able to 
show that it is experiencing hard times. The industry must demonstrate 
that it is materially injured by  reason of  the subsidized imports. To 
determine whether subsidized imports are the cause of material injury 
to a petitioning industry, the  ITC’s reports  reveal  that  it  explicitly 
examines such factors as the depth of any foreign sector subsidies, 
offsetting U.S. subsidies, exchange rates, macroeconomic growth and 
other general economic conditions, foreign-domestic price differentials, 
and the market share of imports. 
The Coalition for Fair  Lumber Imports emphasized four primary 
pieces of  evidence regarding the extent and cause of  the lumber in- 
dustry’s distress in its 1986 case before the ITC: (1) the market share 
of Canadian imports had risen steadily over the last decade (table 11.2); 
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Table 11.2  Imports, Exchange Rates, and Prices 
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had declined over 1977-82,  with only minor recovery since the end of 
the early-1980s  recession (fig.  11.1); (3) profitability in the 1980s had 
deteriorated sharply (fig.  11.2); and (4) despite some recovery in de- 
mand since the early 1980s (fig. 11.1), real U.S. lumber prices showed 
little improvement and remained far below historic highs (table 11.2). 
This last point was played particularly  hard by the Coalition. It pro- 
vided the tactically important argument that “something  is not right” 
with the workings of supply and demand and, by implication, the free 
trade views of neoclassical economists, since recovering demand did 
not pull up prices; the “something”  that was not “right” was Canadian 
stumpage policy (Coalition  1986b). This argument was eventually en- 
dorsed by the ITC. 
The ITC (U.S. ITC 1985) examined a number of indicators of relative 
competitiveness, but these showed little evidence of a strong Canadian 
advantage. As  shown in table  11.3, the Canadians reveal a moderate 
advantage in  unit  labor costs, owing to higher  productivity  (that is, 
Canadian  hourly  wages actually  exceed U.S. wages).  Effective  Ca- 
nadian tax rates, however,  are higher  than  US.  rates in the lumber 
industry, and average total costs of  U.S. and Canadian lumber pro- 
duction hardly differ at all. 
This last observation is a reflection of the efficiency of the Canadian 
log market. That is, it might be thought that low Canadian stumpage 
prices should show up as low Canadian lumber prices. But the stumpage 
price is the price of removing a log from its forest, and, once removed, 346  Joseph P.  Kalt 
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Table 11.3  Determinants of Production Costs in the Softwood Lumber 
Industry 
Average Total Cost 
(US$ per mbf) 
Unit  Labor Cost 
(US$ per mbf) 
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logs are marketed  by  logging firms on the open market to Canadian 
lumber producers. Market-clearing log prices paid by lumber producers 
are roughly uniform, after accounting for quality differentials and trans- 
portation costs (FTC 1986). Canadian prohibitions on log (as opposed 
to lumber) exports do keep in-Canada log prices to lumber mills some- 
what lower than U.S. prices, although differences turn out to be minor 
(U.S. ITC 1985; FTC 1986). 348  Joseph P.  Kalt 
Thus, the vehicle by  which the Canadian stumpage  system could 
subsidize lumber exports is not through direct subsidization of lumber 
production. Rather, Canadian stumpage policy is alleged to subsidize 
lumber exports by subsidizing Canadian loggers, resulting in increased 
timber production turned into increased output from the Canadian lum- 
ber industry (Coalition  1986b). In the absence of  the prohibition on 
Canadian log exports, an increase in Canadian timber production would 
tend to depress log prices evenly throughout  North America-to  the 
benefit of both Canadian and U.S.  lumber mills. In the presence of 
restrictions on log exports, however, log prices tend to be levelized 
through an expansion of the Canadian sellers of log products (such as 
lumber). The result is that more of North America’s sawmill capacity 
comes to be located in Canada than would otherwise be the case-to 
the displeasure of the U.S. Coalition. 
11.2.2  The Economics of the ITC’s Decision 
Upon perusal of the kind of information available to the ITC and 
shown in tables 11.1 -  11.3 and figures 11.1 -  11.2, it is tempting to try 
to apply a more rigorous analysis to see if, in fact, Canadian stumpage 
prices  (table  11.1)  are the cause of  the upward trend  in  the market 
share of  imports (table  11.2), the soft prices in the North American 
lumber market (table 11.2), or depressed industry profitability. Do the 
data indicate changes in Canadian stumpage that correspond to changes 
in  Canadian lumber export performance or lumber price levels? And 
what other explanations (such as exchange rate movements and reces- 
sion) are there for the relative performance of the U.S. and Canadian 
lumber industries? These are, of course, the kinds of analyses that we 
might hope the ITC would perform in a systematic (for instance, econ- 
ometric) fashion. However, there is a much more fundamental issue 
regarding the effects of below-market stumpage pricing in Canada. 
The Federal  Trade Commission, in  its legal role as a guardian of 
consumer  interests  and  in  its  de facto role  as a proponent  of  free 
international trade, intervened in the 1982 and 1986 lumber proceeding 
before the ITC (FTC 1986). In its challenge to the Coalition’s request 
for tariff protection, the FTC argues that the Canadian stumpage sub- 
sidy is entirely  inframarginal; it  has no effect on the level of forest 
harvest and, hence, no effect on Canadian lumber output. With ap- 
propriate references to Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Paul Samuelson, 
and Joan Robinson, the FTC asserts that 
the stumpage fee represents that portion of the trees’ value, or eco- 
nomic rent, that is captured  by  the  landowner.  By  definition, an 
economic rent does not affect the quantity of a factor supplied. Char- 
acterization of stumpage fees as part of economic rent rather than a 
cost that affects the quantity supplied follows from the fact that the 349  Political  Economy of Protectionism 
[Canadian] government, which decides how much land will be made 
available for logging, would make the land available for harvesting 
and loggers would harvest the logs regardless of where the stumpage 
fee is set, so long as it is  within the range between zero and the 
amount by which the value of the logs exceeds the cost of harvesting 
them. (FTC 1986, 22-23) 
The FTC’s interpretation of  the Canadian below-market  stumpage 
prices as gifts of rent to loggers is founded on two observations. First, 
the stumpage prices do not even come close to clearing the market and 
are far exceeded by the market-clearing prices received on resale by 
loggers. That is, once cut, Canadian logs fetch prices that leave logging 
firms with unit revenues that exceed logging expenses and stumpage 
charges. Second, and most fundamentally, Canadian harvest (or “cut”) 
levels on public lands are set administratively without reference to the 
stumpage price. By law, Canadian public cut levels are set (as they are 
on U.S. public lands) according to fundamentally noneconomic, bio- 
logical criteria dealing with the physical sustainable yield, the age of 
the trees, and the species mix  of  the forest. Although specifics vary 
from province to province, the Canadian procedure for establishing a 
cut level begins with official determination of how much acreage to be 
allotted to tree harvesting and when to allocate that acreage to loggers. 
The right to remove timber from cuttable acreage is determined by an 
administrative process that awards long-term cut licenses to selected 
logging firms without charge and on the basis of explicitly noneconomic 
criteria. The licensee then submits a cut plan requiring approval on the 
basis  of  its  conformation  with  sound  logging practice.  Loggers  are 
permitted flexibility to vary their efforts at any point in time as market 
price and cost conditions vary, subject to the overall cut limit over the 
full term of the license. The stumpage price the licensee is charged on 
the removal of timber is determined through an administrative formula 
that arrives at the stumpage value as a net-back from the administra- 
tively calculated log value (FTC 1986). 
In short, the Canadian cut of timber is not determined by reference 
to the price that public authorities receive for timber. Formally, the 
supply response of  the Canadian cut to the stumpage price is zero. 
This conclusion leads directly to the FTC position that the Canadian 
stumpage system has no adverse effect on the U.S. lumber industry. 
The FTC’s conclusion is based, however, on a combination of a priori 
economic theory and a reading of  the literal content of Canadian cut 
policies. The FTC notes that there is an alternative hypothesis regarding 
the responsiveness  of  Canadian timber  supply to the below-market 
stumpage system: “The Canadian stumpage fee systems could lead to 
an increase in the quantity of timber harvested if the timber companies 
successfully lobbied the Canadian federal or provincial governments 350  Joseph P.  Kalt 
to expand the quantity of cutting permitted because the increased eco- 
nomic  rents  they  would  earn  by  cutting  additional  trees  at the  low 
stumpage fee”  (FTC 1986, 30-31,  n. 38; emphasis in original). If true, 
this hypothesis provides support to the Coalition’s assertions  that U.S. 
lumber companies have been harmed by Canadian stumpage practices. 
To test whether the Canadian supply of timber is responsive to the 
stumpage subsidy, we might directly estimate the supply of Canadian 
logs as 
(1)  Q: = Qs  (P,  SUBSZDY, Xc), 
where Q:  is Canadian timber production, P is the price received for 
cut logs, SUBSIDY  is the stumpage subsidy, and X, represents Ca- 
nadian input cost and productivity variables (such as labor costs). The 
view of Canadian stumpage subsidies as entirely inframarginal implies 
that the effect of  SUBSIDY on (3:  is  zero, while  the U.S. lumber 
industry’s assertion is that this effect is positive. 
In reacting to the possibility that Canadian timber supply responds 
positively to stumpage  subsidies, the FTC puts forth the possibility 
that the Canadian stumpage system might even discourage supply. The 
FTC argues that the noncompetitive process of license awards makes 
the Canadian system particularly likely to allocate harvesting to inef- 
ficient firms for whom  some market-cuttable  tracts are unprofitable. 
Raising stumpage fees worsens the fate of such firms and may cause 
a reduction in cut. 
The FTC further notes that the arbitrary Canadian stumpage system 
may typically produce inframarginal rents, but it can also lead to the 
overpricing of some  tracts of cuttable land for which market-determined 
levels of Ricardian rent are less than the stumpage fees. Such lands 
will  go unharvested under the Canadian system; in effect, a rise in 
stumpage has no impact on tracts for which the stumpage fee is less 
than the associated Ricardian rent, but pushes some tracts and their 
supply out of the market. Both  of these hypotheses amount to the 
observation that the Canadian stumpage system can reduce supply if 
and when fees are raised above market levels on particular tracts of 
forest, but  should be entirely  inframarginal  when  set below market 
levels. 
The Canadian logging activity described in equation (1) is plausibly 
determined by the simultaneous action of supply and demand for tim- 
ber. The indigenous Canadian demand for timber can be expressed as 
(2)  Q$ = Q$ (P,  -T), 
where 2,. represents determinants of timber demand, such as housing 
starts or aggregate income. Of course, Canadian timber markets are 
linked through trade in forest products to international markets. This 
really means U.S. markets, as transocean shipping costs effectively 351  Political  Economy of Protectionism 
limit broader trade; only about 5  percent of  North American timber 
output leaves the continent and most  of  these exports are specialty 
and high-grade products. Thus, there  are corresponding supply and 
demand schedules for the U.S. that, together with equations (1) and 
(2), describe the market  for timber  in which  Canadian  loggers find 
themselves. Using u subscripts to denote the United States, this mar- 
ket can be described by equation (1) and the residual demand left over 
for Canadian suppliers after U.S. loggers have put their output on the 
market.8 This demand is 
(3)  Q:‘.u  = Q?  + Qt -  QC  1  Q:‘,,,  (P,XuZ,Zu), 
with s and d continuing to signify supply and demand. 
Expressions (1) and (3) now constitute a two-equation system that 
we can estimate with available (albeit limited) data.9 I have collected 
data for the six Canadian logging regions that produce all but a minute 
amount of the country’s timber (Coastal B.C., Interior B.C., the Prairie 
Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritime Provinces) over 1977-84. 
These data provide 48 sample points on prices (P)  of logs (in real US$/ 
mbf), annual harvest levels (Q:),  and stumpage prices. SUBSIDY is 
measured by the difference between the price received by loggers and 
the stumpage fee.l0 To capture determinants of the cost of logging in 
Canada (XJ,  we have data on industry labor costs and productivity.” 
Corresponding measures are used to capture X,, for the United States. 
The demand determinants reflected in Z, and Z,, are measured by hous- 
ing starts per year. The supply schedule in equation (1) is estimated 
using the pooled data and utilizing two-stage least squares, instrumental 
variables techniques that allow the separation of  supply factors from 
demand influences on Canadian timber prices and quantities. 
The estimated Canadian timber supply function is shown in table 
11.4. A log-log (no pun intended, just lucky) specification is employed 
and produces elasticities of supply with respect to the indicated vari- 
ables. My  econometric “fishing”  was restricted to the endogeneity/ 
exogeneity  of  SUBSIDY and  labor productivity,  and the  inclusion/ 
exclusion of the lagged value of the dependent variable (Q;).  Results 
were not sensitive to these choices, including the magnitude and sign 
of the effect of SUBSIDY. Although confidence is weak, the elasticity 
of Canadian timber supply with respect to the price received by loggers 
appears to be of the same magnitude that others have reported when 
estimating U.S. supply functions (e.g., Adams, McCarl, and Homay- 
ounfarrokh  1986). It appears that the data allow the detection, with 
fairly good confidence, of the supply effects of costs and productivity 
factors. 
Table  11.4 indicates  that the elasticity of  Canadian timber supply 
with respect to official stumpage prices has a point estimate of -  0.13. 
There is moderate confidence suggested for this result, but I believe 352  Joseph P.  Kalt 
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Table 11.4  Does the Canadian Stumpage System Subsidize Lumber Exports? 
The Canadian Timber Supply Function 
Variable 
2-Tail 
Expected Sign  Elasticity  Signif. 
+ 
Stumpage subsidy  (Lobbying for +  Q) 
0 
(Inframarginal rents) 
Price  + 
Labor Costs/HR  - 
Labor Productivity  t 
Intercepts 
-0.13  0.27 
(-1.13) 
+0.23  0.46 
-  2.03  0.04 
+0.68  0.003 
(.73 
( -  2.09) 
(3.14) 
0.10-0.00 
Notes:  Standard error = 0.11; F-statistic = 307.14; D.W.  =  1.84; and number of  ob- 
servations = 48. 
the most that can really be said is that the approach and data employed 
here have produced no evidence that the Canadian system of stumpage 
subsidies results in an increase in Canadian timber supply. In this neg- 
ative sense, my results are supportive of the view that the ITC incor- 
rectly  ruled that the Canadian  timber  pricing system constituted an 
export subsidy to the lumber industry that warranted countervailing 
U.S. duties. 
This is not to say that, had the ITC seen table  11.4 (or understood 
the FTC’s argument about inframarginalism), it would have ruled any 
differently. My reading of the record of the case is that the ITCs decision 
turned on a combination of (1) evidence that, for whatever reason, the 
U.S. lumber industry finds itself in poor condition, and (2) irresistible 
domestic, election-year political forces. Indeed, from the Administra- 
tion’s point of  view, it must have seemed far preferable to have pro- 
tection for the lumber industry emanate from the Commerce Department 
and the ITC, rather than from congressional legislation. The former 
leaves the Administration  in  control of  both  the level of  duties and 
negotiations with the Canadians regarding remedial measures. 
11.3  The Welfare Consequences of Protection 
Even if there were compelling evidence that the Canadian stumpage 
system for timber effectively subsidized the expansion of the Canadian 
lumber industry, the existence of  a subsidy, by itself, would provide 
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industry. Indeed, taking the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus 
as our yardstick of aggregate national welfare, the ITC might be in- 
structed to send a note of gratitude to the Canadians, rather than impose 
a tariff against them. If  Canada would like to tax other sectors of its 
economy (through resource diversion into timber and lumber produc- 
tion) to subsidize the production of goods for which the United States 
is a large net consumer, the United States benefits. 
This (neo)classic response to the importation of products subsidized 
by foreign governments, of course, needs to be qualified. For example, 
were Canadian lumber subsidies part of a predatory strategy to drive 
the  U.S.  industry under in  anticipation of  a subsequent exercise of 
monopoly power, the United States might appropriately respond with 
protective tariffs.  Successful predation,  however,  has as its first re- 
quirement the ability of the predator to drive its victim’s capital out of 
production and to keep that capital out of production. This is hard to 
imagine in the timber or lumber industries. In the former, the basic 
capital stock on which production is based just keeps on growing if 
taken out of production, and the lumber industry’s mills are extremely 
long-lived and highly specific to lumber production.I2  At any rate, figure 
11.1 indicates that capital has been (re)entering the U.S.  industry since 
the bottom of the early-1980s recession. 
Other, nonpredatory justifications for countervailing against a sub- 
sidy to Canadian shipments of lumber are also difficult to defend. The 
Canadian industry is quite competitively structured and hardly presents 
an oligopolistic front to the United  States. The lumber industry, in 
general,  is low  on the list of  industries likely to produce beneficial 
technological spillovers if  protected against subsidized imports. Stra- 
tegic, national defense justifications for protecting an indigenous soft- 
wood (construction) lumber industry are equally unconvincing,  since 
the  probability  of  a military interdiction that  cuts off  supplies from 
Canada seems so farfetched. In fact, the Coalition for Fair Lumber 
Imports is notable, if not commendable, among lobbyists seeking pro- 
tection for its not waving the national security banner. 
11.3.1  The United States as an Import Monopsonist 
If  there is a nationalistic (that is, national welfare) justification for 
tariffs on imported lumber, it lies in the observation that the United 
States is  a  large-country importer  of  softwood  products.  As  noted 
above, North America is virtually a closed market. The United States 
annually buys more than 60 percent of Canadian lumber production, 
and other outlets for Canada are subject to very high  transportation 
costs and tend to be restricted to specialty products.  Moreover, the 
elasticities of Canadian lumber supply, both for total production and 
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south is its primary market, and the economics of forestry and milling 
are such that production levels are not especially sensitive to price. 
Policies such as U.S. import duties have the potential of  depressing 
lumber and timber prices in Canada, and the country is an easy target 
for monopsonistic U.S. trade policies that improve the U.S. terms of 
trade-unless  it can credibly retaliate. 
Canada has, however, considerable scope for defending itself against 
an aggressive, monopsonistic United States. Canada is, for all intents 
and purposes, the sole foreign supplier of  lumber to a country with a 
very inelastic demand.I4 In  1984, for example, the United States im- 
ported 12.995 billion board feet of softwood lumber. Fully 99.6 percent 
(12.947 billion board feet) of this total came from Canada. 
The current trade wars in the timber industry, then, are being played 
out in a setting in which both trading partners have significant market 
power. Each might like to exercise its respective ability to act as a 
price maker, but the danger that a move away from the traditional free 
trade equilibrium will force the other country to exercise its market 
power is very real. 
The stakes that the United States and Canada face, if not the game- 
theoretic optimal strategies each could play, can be quantified through 
the application of existing information on supply and demand responses 
in the lumber industry. From the U.S. perspective, an import duty on 
lumber from Canada has the potential of depressing the price of  Ca- 
nadian imports. Domestic producers stand to gain as the duty-inclusive 
price  of  imports is  driven  up.  U.S.  lumber  consumers may  not  be 
pleased  by  having to pay  higher prices, but the  U.S. Treasury can 
collect  the tariff wedge between  U.S.  and  Canadian  lumber prices. 
Depending on the height of the duty relative to the optimal monopsony 
tariff, the gains to U.S. producers and the Treasury can outweigh the 
losses of domestic consumers, and in that sense raise aggregate national 
welfare. 
To estimate winners’ gains and losers’ losses from U.S. lumber du- 
ties, I have parameterized a simple three-sector model of North Amer- 
ican  lumber  trade,  employing the  estimates  of  supply  and  demand 
elasticities provided by researchers who have specialized in modeling 
lumber markets. This model is used to simulate alternative tariff policies 
and measure the associated incidence and welfare effects. There are 
two supply sectors to be captured: the U.S. supply (Q;)  and the supply 
of imports from Canada (Qt.). These supplies must be priced to clear 
the U.S. market, given U.S. demand for lumber (E).  The two supply 
schedules and one demand schedule are taken to have constant elas- 
ticity  functional forms over the  relevant  range,  such that  Q  = UP€ 
where E represents the elasticity.I5 When a duty oft  percent is imposed 
on imports, the import supply schedule as perceived  by  the United 
States becomes: 355  Political Economy of Protectionism 
Q:  = a,  [(I  + t)PIIE' 
where P'  refers to the duty-exclusive delivered price of Canadian lum- 
ber and P  = (1 + t)p.  Solution of Q:  + Q:  = QJ!  for P then yields 
equilibrium prices and quantities. The model's results are clearly partial 
equilibrium results in  the  sense that no feedback effects to the ma- 
croeconomy or close substitutes and complements are calculated. 
The elasticity of  U.S. lumber supply is taken to have a value of  .42, 
which is the three-region weighted (1985 quantities) average of supply 
elasticities reported by Adams, McCarl, and Homayounfarrokh (1986). 
Domestic demand elasticity is set at -.15,  which accords with esti- 
mates reported  by  Spelter (1985) and Adams, McCarl, and Homay- 
ounfarrokh (1986). The most important of the elasticity values is the 
value for the elasticity of import supply from Canada. This elasticity 
fundamentally determines the extent of any U.S. monopsony  power 
vis-a-vis Canada. This elasticity reflects both the elasticity of Canadian 
demand and the elasticity of Canadian supply: 
(4)  E'  = EJ(Q:/Q:)  -  ~f(1  - Qr/Q:). 
Adams, McCarl, and Homayounfarrokh (1986) estimate a value of .917 
for E'  and this value is employed here. This is close to the estimate of 
0.89 reported  by  Boyd and  Krutilla (1987). While an import  supply 
elasticity of  less than one may seem small, it also accords with direct 
calculation of  equation (4). Employing 1984 values for the quantities 
in equation (4), assuming that Canadian consumers have the same de- 
mand elasticity as U.S. consumers, and taking a value of E:  = .23 from 
table 11.4 produces an import supply elasticity of approximately 0.9. 
Any  value in  this range  suggests a very  high  degree of  monopsony 
power for the United States. 
The Effects of a 15  Percent Countervailing Duty 
Under the foregoing parameterizations, table 1 1 .5 reports the calcu- 
lated incidence and welfare effects of a 15 percent U.S. countervailing 
Table 11.5  Welfare Consequences of a 15 Percent U.S. Lumber Duty (millions 
of 1986 dollars) 
Gains  Losses 
U.S. lumber producers  $416.8 
U.S. lumber users  $556.9 
U.S. government  $340.5 
Net U.S.  $200.4 
Net Canada  $223.0 
Net U.S. and Canada  $22.5 
(labor, capital, land) 
(intermediate and final) 
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duty on Canadian lumber imports. Table  1 1.6 shows the corresponding 
price and quantity impacts on the North American lumber market. In 
each table, it is assumed that Canada does not respond with retaliation 
of any form. A  15 percent duty raises domestic lumber prices (by ap- 
proximately 5 percent). Through the monopsony effect, however, the 
duty also depresses Canadian lumber prices. U.S.  lumber producers are 
unambiguously better off-by  an estimated $400 million per year. The 
U.S.  Treasury also realizes a gain from tariff revenues totaling $340 mil- 
lion annually. These benefits are in contrast to the negative effects of a 
15 percent duty on U.S. lumber consumers. Consumers suffer a burden 
of over $550 million per year. 
The gains of U.S. lumber producers and the Treasury are large enough 
to more than offset consumers’ losses. In this sense, a 15 percent duty 
raises national welfare. The duty effectively transfers some of the rents 
that otherwise accrue to Canadian lumber producers to U.S. producers 
and to U.S.  governmental revenue collections. As a result, Canada in 
its role as a net producer of lumber is worse off. Canadian losses are 
on the order of $220 million (US$) per year. The $20 million excess of 
Canadian losses over U.S.  gains is the deadweight “world”  loss as a 
result of the exercise of U.S. monopsony in the international lumber 
market. 
The “Optimal” Tariff 
If the United States benefits, on net, from a 15 percent lumber duty, 
how far could it push the duty and still see rising benefits? How high 
is the optimal tariff? This question is addressed in tables 11.7 and 11.8. 
Assuming  no Canadian policy response, table  11.8 indicates that the 
optimal duty is roughly 50 percent. A duty of this magnitude has very 
large  impacts on the lumber market. The optimal duty would  drive 
domestic lumber prices up sharply, severely depress Canadian prices, 
cut imports by close to 40 percent, and raise domestic production by 
10 percent. 
Table 11.6  Market Effects of a 15 Percent U.S. Timber Duty (1986 dollars) 
% Change from  Price/Quantity 
No Tariff  Impact 
Tariff  15  $29/mbf 
Change in  U.S. Price  5  $13/mbf 
Change in Canadian price  -9  ~  $ I Wmbf 
Change in  U.S. production  2  698mmbf 
Change in imports  -8  -  1026mmbf 
Change in  U.S. consumption  -I  -  328mmbf 357  Political Economy of Protectionism 
Table 11.7  Welfare Consequences of an “Optimal”  U.S. Lumber Tariff 
(millions of  1986 dollars) 
Gains  Losses 
U.S. lumber producers  $2,249.0 
U.S. lumber users  $2,910.2 
U.S. government  $1,119.9 
Net U.S.  $458.7 
Net Canada  $890.0 
Net U.S. and Canada  $431.2 
(labor, capital, land) 
(intermediate and final) 
(tariff revenues) 
The optimal, unopposed tariff  would be a great boon to domestic 
lumber producers, who would  realize  a gain of over $2.2 billion  per 
year.  Similarly, the Treasury would see tariff revenues of more than 
$1.1 billion. These gains are in contrast to the $3 billion loss that would 
be experienced by domestic consumers. This burden would manifest 
itself in higher home construction costs and higher prices of homes, 
apartments, and commercial buildings. The gains of U.S. lumber pro- 
ducers and revenue collectors from an optimal tariff  would outweigh 
the losses of  consumers, by the definition of optimal. The net gain to 
the nation would be on the order of $450 million per year. 
An optimal tariff would hit Canada extremely hard. As indicated in 
table 11.7, Canada would suffer a loss of almost $900 million per year. 
For an economy of the size of Canada’s, this sum is hardly trivial and 
could be expected to engender a vociferous response designed to ex- 
ploit Canada’s monopoly power. The net international deadweight loss 
of $430  million, however, would presumably go unnoticed by anyone. 
As previously discussed, the central parameter determining the de- 
gree of U.S. monopsony power in the lumber market is the elasticity 
of import supply.  Not only is there the usual  statistical  uncertainty 
Table 11.8  Market Effects of an “Optimal”  U.S. Lumber Tariff (1986 dollars) 
96  Change from  Price/Quantity 
No Tariff  Impact 
Tariff  53 
Change in U.S. price  26 
Change in Canadian price  -41 
Change in  U.S. production  10 
Change in U.S. consumption  -3 
Change in imports  ~  38 
$140lmbf 
$65/mbf 
-  $85/mbf 
3408mbf 
-  4929mbf 
-  1521mbf 358  Joseph P.  Kalt 
about this parameter, but an optimal tariff as large as indicated by table 
11.8 would severely depress Canadian lumber prices.  This could be 
expected to open up very significant trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic 
trade for the Canadians, and would effectively move the United States 
into a much more elastic portion of the Canadian import supply func- 
tion. To provide some indication of the sensitivity of welfare implica- 
tions to the import supply elasticity, figure 11.3 graphs the net national 
U.S. welfare gains from an optimal tariff over alternative values of the 
import supply elasticity (again assuming no policy response by Can- 
ada). Cutting the import supply elasticity to .5 would imply an increase 
in U.S. monopsony power, and the net gain from an optimal tariff would 
exceed $700 million annually. Doubling the initial value of the import 
supply elasticity to 1.8 cuts the optimal tariff; the associated net welfare 
gains would be less than $200 million per year. 
11.3.2  Canada as an Export Monopolist 
Optimal duties approaching 50 percent  are primarily of  academic 
interest. The vehement response of the Canadians to the October ac- 
tions in support of  a 15 percent import duty provides an indication of 
the intolerance that would meet an even higher duty-and  that would 
invalidate the calculations in tables 11.7 and 11.8. Moreover, the U.S. 
political and administrative process provides no indication that it con- 
Import Elasticity 
Fig. 11.3  Optimal U.S. timber tariff. 359  Political Economy of Protectionism 
siders an optimal duty within the realm of possibility. The U.S. lumber 
industry’s most aggressive demands have been in the range of  25-28 
percent. 
More relevant  than the matter of  an optimal tariff is whether the 
kinds of distributional payoffs to the domestic lumber industry and/or 
the associated net national impacts of  the magnitudes shown in table 
I I .5 were worth putting the United States’ broader relationships with 
Canada at risk of  significant deterioration. The end result, after all, is 
that  the  negotiations  regarding a general free trade agreement have 
been set back, and the December 30,  1986 lumber accords have left 
the United States subject to a monopolistic Canadian export tariff. 
Table 11.9 shows estimates of  the incidence and welfare effects of 
the Canadian 15 percent export duty, relative to the previous free trade 
regime.  l6 The Canadian export duty raises delivered lumber prices in 
the United States and depresses prices in Canada. In fact, news reports 
out of the timber- and lumber-producing regions of Canada are already 
reporting output and employment cutbacks, as well as the attendant 
public outcry  against  the  Canadian  government for agreeing to the 
export duty. The export duty, however, permits Canada to exercise its 
monopoly power vis-a-vis the United States-although  it is apparently 
no consolation that the resulting monopoly rents accrue to the Canadian 
treasury rather than to the Canadian timber and lumber industries. On 
net, Canada appears to gain roughly $120 million per year from the 15 
percent lumber export duty. 
The U.S. lumber industry cares little if its prices are raised by a U.S. 
import tariff or an equivalent Canadian export tariff (table 11.9).  (In fact, 
this observation probably carries the heart of the political economy of 
the timber trade war.) U.S. lumber consumers are equally indifferent to 
the reason the prices they face are going up. At the national level, the 
Table 11.9  Welfare Consequences of a 15 Percent Canadian Export Duty 
(millions of 1986 dollars) 
Gains  Losses 
U.S. lumber producers  $416.8 
U.S. lumber users  $556.9 
(labor, capital, land) 
(intermediate and final) 
(tariff revenues) 
U.S. government  $0.0 
Net U.S.  $140.1 
Net Canada  $1 17.6 
Net U.S.  and Canada  $22.5 360  Joseph P.  Kalt 
primary economic difference between the countervailing duty and the 
ultimate Canadian export tax that has been adopted is found in which 
government gets to collect the tariff revenues. The move from a U.S. 
import duty to a Canadian export duty has caused a transfer from the 
U.S. Treasury to the Canadian treasury. Relative to the pre-Octoberfree 
trade regime, the United States now finds itself $140 million per year 
worse off. From a national perspective, the war has not gone well. 
11.4  Conclusion 
11.4.1  Observations on the Conduct of U.S.-Canadian Trade 
Relations 
What began in October 1986 as a monopsonistic action against Can- 
ada has ended with a breakdown of free trade in  lumber and the im- 
position  of  a  monopoly  tariff  against  the  United  States.  While  the 
economic logic of this is troubling, the political rationale does not seem 
hard to fathom. The U.S. lumber industry appears to have pulled off 
a classic case of  industry capture of the political process. 
It is fashionable to criticize simple industry “capture”  theories of 
economic policy-making (e.g., Kalt and Zupan 1984),  and in some sense 
it would be nice if there were a more complicated and less traditional 
story to tell  here.  In  this  case,  however,  the  capture theory  holds 
considerable appeal: the U.S. lumber industry  was able to organize 
itself into a highly  effective  lobby group that  was  able  to organize 
virtually all timber and lumber producers, suppress free-rider faction- 
alism, produce technical legal and analytic submissions to the relevant 
administrative agency, and enlist particularly important congressional 
support in its appeals to the White House, the Commerce Department, 
and the ITC. In Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Georgia, and Alabama, 
the November elections for the U.S. Senate provided the catalyst that 
forced the political process to focus on the lumber industry. The finding, 
three weeks prior to the elections, that Canada was subsidizing lumber 
production and was subject to countervailing duties may have angered 
the  Canadians, but  within  two months  a negotiated  settlement was 
reached that left the U.S. lumber industry and Canada better off than 
if  no intervention had occurred. This helped the Administration pre- 
serve, or at  least  partially  salvage, its  relations  with  Canada while 
supplying the benefits to the domestic sector that put forth the most 
compelling political demand. In classic Stigler-Olson fashion (that is, 
more concentrated groups are more effective at political organization), 
the U.S. consumers of lumber products were so diffuse and faced such 
low per capita stakes relative to lumber producers that they had (and 361  Political Economy of  Protectionism 
continue to have) little ability to block moves to raise the prices they 
Pay. 
From the Canadian perspective, the prospect of a countervailing duty 
imposed by the United States created sharp strategic choices: fight the 
ITC and Commerce Department findings through the courts or nego- 
tiate a settlement. The former path  suggests a  strategy designed to 
convince the United States of  Canadian toughness in  opposing mon- 
opsonistic U.S. tariffs, but why take this stand? The negotiated settle- 
ment, after all, offered the prospect of a net gain for Canada-a  victory 
in the timber trade war. To imply, however, that the Canadians adopted 
the negotiations approach because they were pursuing the Net Canada 
entry in table 11.7 is to beg the question of why the Canadian political 
process would be driven less by capturing private interests and more 
by considerations of net national economic welfare than is the policy 
process in the United States. The Canadian lumber and timber indus- 
tries would appear to be no less powerful relative to consumers than 
their counterparts in  the United States, and they have not benefited 
from the timber trade war. The reality seems to be that Canada really 
was put in a defensive posture when the United  States launched its 
import duty, and the negotiated settlement was explicitly justified in- 
ternally in Canada by the argument that, if there is going to be a duty 
on lumber, it is better that Canada collect the sizable tariff revenues 
than let these monies accrue to the U.S. government. 
It remains to be  seen whether the timber trade war is completely 
over. If it is rekindled, the impetus will come from Canada. Only within 
Canada is  there  significant, continuing  unrest and distress  over the 
current state of affairs. Layoffs have begun in the Canadian timber and 
lumber industries, and nationalistic sentiments have been piqued by a 
sense of having been put on the defensive by the United States. The 
global solution may still ride on the fate of ongoing attempts to establish 
a general  free trade  agreement. The lumber incident, however,  has 
probably reduced the prospects of  a broad agreement. In the United 
States the lumber and timber industries now have vested interests in 
opposing a return toward  free trade, and in Canada mistrust  of  the 
United States runs high. 
11.4.2  Observations on the Conduct of Protectionist U.S. Trade 
Policies 
The U  .S.-Canadian lumber dispute forcefully demonstrates that the 
realms  in  which trade wars are fought  are not  solely the economic 
marketplaces. The outcome of  the lumber dispute has hinged signifi- 
cantly on broader geopolitical, foreign policy concerns. For, at the core, 
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domestic political necessity of transferring wealth to the U.S. forest 
products industry, while (2) trying to keep the Canadians “happy.” The 
essence of the negotiated settlement of December 1986 (and table 11.9) 
is that to accomplish the former, the United States had to raise the 
amount it pays for the latter-by  $1 17.6 million per year (table 11.9). 
This interpretation of  the timber trade war explains why the U.S. 
political system ended up at table 11.9-a  Canadian monopoly export 
tariff-rather  than a table 11.5-a  U.S. monopsony import tariff. If the 
path to protection for the U.S. industry was a U.S. import duty, Canada 
was going to be harmed-table  1 1.5. The prospect of direct economic 
harm, as well as the fueling of Canadian nationalism, was demonstrably 
going to reduce the supply of an important ally’s cooperation in the 
conduct  of  U.S. foreign policy. As Prime Minister  Mulroney  noted 
(threatened?), it is “extremely difficult for anyone . . . to be friends 
with the Americans.” 
This kind of Canadian response was unacceptable to the White House 
and, especially, to the State Department. But if  protection had to be 
delivered, the congressional, legislative route to protection for the U.S. 
lumber and timber industries was the least appealing course: it would 
be extremely difficult and time-consuming to repeal tariff legislation 
and replace it with a policy that transferred wealth back to Canada. 
The alternative result of a temporary U.S. duty replaced by a negotiated 
Canadian export tariff was far more appealing, the Net U.S. loss of 
$140.1 million per year from table 11.9 is the price the nation has paid 
to satisfy  the domestic political demands of  the timber and lumber 
industries while ensuring  continued  Canadian  cooperation and  alle- 
giance in the conduct of  foreign policy. This sum really is a net loss 
for the United States: the country now pays a higher price to Canada 
for no more, and probably less, Canadian contribution to U.S. foreign 
policy. 
The path of protectionism that this case reveals is sobering. It is not 
a picture of  the United States engaged in strategic moves to improve 
the national welfare. It is not even a picture of the United States and 
its trading partners engaging in  mutually destructive rounds of eco- 
nomic retaliation. Rather, it is a picture of the United States pushed 
into protectionist measures by powerful domestic political interests and 
then, through the foreign policy branches of  government, having to 
find ways to quickly halt the resulting trade war and appease the af- 
fected foreign nations.”  The United States must act in this way be- 
cause, as the dominant member of its alliances, it is forced to bear the 
brunt of  the responsibility for maintaining those alliances. Thus, this 
case suggests that, at least when  it affects allies, protectionism  can 
raise the cost and inhibit the conduct of foreign economic and political 
policy. 363  Political Economy of Protectionism 
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1. The shakes and shingles duties arose out of a section 201 case before the 
International Trade Commission. Section 201 cases allow for import protection 
of a domestic industry when the ITC is satisfied that imports have been shown 
“to be a substantial cause of serious injury.”  This criterion makes no reference 
to unfair trading practices by foreign competitors and is generally regarded as 
outside the intent of GATT provisions for countervailing duties. 
2. New York Times, October 9, 1986. 
3. New  York Times, January 1, 1987. 
4. Ibid. 
5. New  York Times, October 17, 1986. 
6. MacClean’s, January 5, 1987, 38. 
7.  The coalition’s filings before the ITC predictably include a list of additional 
Canadian subsidies that allegedly harm U.S.  lumber producers. This list in- 
cludes preferential tax treatment, loan guarantee programs, and public refores- 
tation programs. At least the first of these does not appear to be substantiated 
by the data (see table  I1.3), and reading the coalition’s discussion of these 
other subsidies, it is hard to resist the impression that the list of  U.S. pref- 
erential programs for the forestry industry could be made to seem as extensive 
as the Canadian list. 
8. After adjustment for transport costs and exchange rates. This formulation 
assumes that the process of log-price equalization through trade in log products 
works within  the period  of  observation (one year in  the data used below). 
Available data require this approach. 
9. The basic limitation is disaggregated stumpage fees that can be matched 
to appropriate measures of logging output. All data employed here are from 
U.S. ITC 1985. 
10.  Data that would  permit  a more accurate accounting for the market- 
clearing stumpage price and the actual price are not available on a comparable 
basis. 
11. The latter, in particular, may be endogenous since its measurement in- 
volves @. Results reported below treat labor productivity as an endogenous 
variable. Results are not sensitive to this. 
12. The human capital in the lumber industry is not particularly high skilled, 
with low-skill  labor dominating the work force (see, e.g., the wages in table 
1 I .3). It is also notable for its unwillingness to relocate. 
13. See, for example, Adams and Haynes 1981; Adams, McCarl, and Ho- 
mayounfarrokh  1986; and Boyd and Krutilla 1987. 
14. Adams, McCarl, and Homayounfarrokh 1986, for example, estimates the 
elasticity of U.S.  lumber demand to be in the range of  -.  I5 to -  .17. 
15. The a’s are explicitly calculated by parameterization  of E and insertion 
of actual values of Q and P. 
16. The price and quantity effects are as indicated in table 11.8. 364  Joseph P. Kalt 
17. The United  States-Japan  dispute over Japanese auto imports followed 
the same general course: U.S. quota restrictions were superseded by Japanese 
voluntary export restraints that leave the rents from trade restriction in Japan. 
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Comment  Arye L. Hillman 
Joseph Kalt has presented us with a most interesting case study of the 
political economy of protection. Kait’s study confirms the appropri- 
Arye L. Hillman  is  professor  of economics in  the  Department of  Economics  and 
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ateness of the political-influence models of protection in explaining the 
formulation of  international trade policy and reveals how approaches 
to the determination of  trade policy that presume a benevolent gov- 
ernment pursuing efficiency objectives assume motivations for inter- 
vention that tend to be of little importance in the political arena wherein 
trade policy decisions are made. A particularly  interesting aspect of 
the study is the revelation that whereas initially pleas for protection 
went unheeded, once the loophole had been found that provided a legal 
basis for protection, competition arose between the executive and leg- 
islative branches of government to become the provider of protection. 
This competition  is clearly  understood  in  political economy terms. 
Given that protection could now be provided, both the executive and 
legislative branches of government sought to reap the benefits attendant 
on being the agents dispensing increases in rents to the residual claim- 
ants in the domestic import-competing industry. Presumably the trans- 
action  is  not  one  way; protection  is provided  against  an offsetting 
return. The political competition was to designate the beneficiary of 
the return. 
The economic theory underlying political-support-maximizing choice 
of trade policy is based on the principle that policymakers  trade off 
the political costs and benefits of  intervention; the costs are the loss 
of political support from the losers from intervention and the benefits 
are the gains via the political support from the beneficiaries. Kalt shows 
us that complex linkages can underlie this costlbenefit calculation. The 
United States instigated protection for the domestic lumber industry. 
But  such  protection  in  the form of  an import  tariff has  associated 
political costs that either are absent or at least can be diminished if the 
same protection were seen to be the consequence of a trade-restricting 
policy by a foreign government, in this case, Canada. Hence, if  one 
asks why the U.S. government insisted that the Canadians impose an 
export tax to replace the U.S. import duty, thereby transferring $220 
million of revenue annually to Canada, the answer can only be that the 
political benefits to the United States of  casting Canada as the inter- 
ventionist government were at least equal to the present value of the 
revenue stream. 
Of course, the ITC’s position was that intervention in this case cor- 
rected for a market distortion rather than created one. Kalt’s econo- 
metrics confirm that the assignment of rights to Canadian trees is a 
story about rents rather than subsidies. Rent-seeking activities of Ca- 
nadian loggers could have evoked an output response, but Kalt’s es- 
timates  indicate  that  the  supply  of  Canadian  logs  is  determined 
administratively, and thus, from an economic perspective, inelastically 
with respect to the price of logs. Thus the ITC’s reasoning went the 
wrong way around: the difference between the payments made for logs 
in  Canada and the United States does not affect Canadian output of 366  Joseph P. Kalt 
logs, but administratively determined Canadian output establishes the 
value of  the residual rents available to the recipients of the rights to 
fell Canadian trees. 
Thus, rents are assigned in Canada via rights to trees, presumably 
to individuals who are adept rent-seekers. And a restriction of Canadian 
lumber exports increases the rents available in the U.S. lumber indus- 
try. The list of gainers, not taking into account more complex general 
equilibrium interdependencies, consists of the claimants to rents in the 
U.S.  lumber industry, the Canadian federal government as the recipient 
of  the revenue from  the  export tax,  and Canadian  consumers who 
presumably benefit from lower domestic lumber prices via the output- 
substitution effect of the export tariff on domestic Canadian producers’ 
market allocation decisions; one must infer that the gainers also include 
the U.S.  government, which initiated the interventionist process in the 
first place. Missing from this list are US.  consumers of lumber, whose 
loss from intervention Kalt quantifies, and the Canadian logging industry. 
The absence of the Canadian logging industry from the list of gainers 
from  intervention is somewhat of  a puzzle. After  all, the Canadian 
loggers appear sufficiently politically astute and well organized to be 
the beneficiaries of the substantial rents from below-market-price ac- 
cess to Canadian trees. But enter a new set of actors: the Canadian 
provincial authorities who assign the right to log and thereby allocate 
the rents from logging. The Canadian export tax on lumber therefore 
effected a transfer from the beneficiaries of  administrative allocation 
decisions made by the provinces to the Canadian federal government. 
The Canadian  provinces lost  and the Canadian  federal  government 
gained via discretionary assignment of rents and revenues. 
There is one final step in tracing through the transfer of rents. The 
Canadian federal government has announced that revenue  from the 
export tax is to be transferred to the provincial authorities, who, we 
recall, exercise the discretion to determine the assignment  of  rents 
from access to trees. Thus, somewhat circuitously, the Canadian pro- 
vincial authorities  have  secured a  share of  the rents accruing from 
Canadian timber production. Of course, the provincial authorities could 
directly secure access to these rents if they could directly sell the right 
to trees. But the right to trees is “given away” at prices below market 
value. The export tax permits the Canadian provincial authorities to 
secure natural resource rents that otherwise are allocated via the in- 
teraction between provincial officials and loggers. 
We  have not been told how the Canadian federal government, the 
Canadian provincial authorities, and Canadian loggers decide on the 
mechanism for sharing Canadian natural resource timber rents. Nor do 
we know the sharing rule for the monopoly rents from restriction  of 
Canadian supply. However, the Canadian rent recipients together have 367  Political Economy of Protectionism 
more rents to share subsequent to the intervention, because of the 
exercise of monopoly power. Taking the Canadian rent recipients into 
consideration, the list of losers from the United States-Canada  lumber 
intervention  reduces to one-domestic U.S. consumers. And this is 
what the political economy approach to explaining government inter- 
vention would predict. The diffused domestic U.S. consumers of the 
import-competing goods are the source of the rents for the more co- 
hesive U.S. and Canadian industry-specific interests and for the Ca- 
nadian authorities. “Rational ignorance” or perhaps “rational apathy” 
of the U.S. consumer facilitates this outcome. 
Joseph Kalt is to be complimented for unraveling all of this for us, 
and for showing us how good applied economic theory and econo- 
metrics can be put to use to demonstrate that even though governments 
may frame their interventionist motives in efficiency terms, consider- 
ations of political support and income distribution, and not efficiency, 
more often explain governments’ interventionist decisions. Indeed, in 
this case, since both governments appear to have gained,  Kalt  has 
shown us how international economic policy can well be collusive. The 
U.S.  government can claim that it had no choice but to react to the 
Canadian “subsidy”; the Canadian federal government can claim that 
given the options it was presented by the U.S.  government, it had no 
choice but  to implement the export tax transferring  the revenue to 
Canada for discretionary  spending. And the Canadian provincial au- 
thorities, who also appear to be ultimate beneficiaries of the rent trans- 
fers, can claim to have been passive agents throughout the entire affair. 
Kalt computes estimates of the Harberger efficiency costs of gov- 
ernment intervention. But to these costs of intervention one could add 
the value of the real resources expended in contesting the rents created 
and assigned at government discretion. Direct computation of the cost 
of rent-seeking activity is not possible in this instance because we are 
not in a position to observe the various rent-seeking outlays that have 
been made. However, we are able to observe the values of the rents 
assigned and transfers made as the consequence of intervention, and 
procedures (for example, reviewed in Hillman  1988) can be proposed 
for inferring the value of the resources expended in a rent-seeking quest 
from the observed value of the rent being contested. The addition of 
the real  resource cost of rent-seeking activity  would  result in an in- 
crease over the estimates of social loss based on Harberger efficiency 
costs alone. 
Finally,  a straightforward  application of a basic theorem from the 
theory of international trade demonstrates a difficulty with the initial 
basis of the U.S. timber industry’s claim of “unfairness”  in interna- 
tional trade practices. The U.S.  timber industry complained that it was 
“unfair”  that  it  did  not  have  access to “cheap”  Canadian lumber 368  Joseph P.  Kalt 
because of the Canadian government’s ban on the export of logs. How- 
ever, the factor-price equalization theorem suggests that in a free trade 
equilibrium there would be no difference in price between Canadian and 
U.S. lumber, notwithstanding the Canadian export ban on logs. Kalt 
reports labor costs in the Canadian and U.S. timber industries to be more 
or  less the same. Given a common technological coefficient on loghum- 
ber, the price of logs is then equalized internationally if there is free trade 
in lumber. The complaint of the U.S. timber producers was therefore 
presumably not that they were denied access in the free trade equilib- 
rium to “cheap” Canadian logs but that they were barred from access 
to competition for the rents associated with the assignments of rights to 
Canadian trees. The United States-Canada  lumber intervention  then 
proceeded to provide compensating rents for the U.S.  domestic indus- 
try, and indeed it would appear there are gains all around, except for 
U.S.  consumers. 
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